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No problem has proved more refractory to lawyers
and scholars than understanding and explaining how inter-
national law is made. Domestic analogues, whose ex-
planatory power may be inadequate even in their own
contexts, have so little relevance to the complexities
of international politics that those who invoke them
finish either by throwing up their hands and conceding
that the model is inappropriate for the taskl or by
painting themselves into the palpably absurd position
that there is no international law.2  But, of course,
there are many effective international norms. To gain-
say such norms because of a theory is a grotesque cari-
cature of understanding and scholarship. As the world
becomes more pervasively transnational and interdepen-
dent, an understanding of how international law is
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made and, even more to the point, of how to make it,
becomes a matter of greatest practical urgency. In any
community how law is made immensely affects the shaping
and sharing of all values.
The making of law is a decision function3 which
may be conveniently described as prescription, By pre-
scription, we refer to a process of communication which
creates, in a target audience, a complex set of expec-
tations comprising three distinctive components: expec-
tations about a policy content; expectations about au-
thority; and expectations about control. 4 Schematical-
ly, these indispensable, coaxial expectations may be
indicated as follows:
pol-icy content) '
Communicatorsj authority signal Target Audience
I control intentionJ
Each of these expectation components may itself be
complex. In a heterogeneous community of varying
3. Prescription is one of seven component functions which
comprise the various types of decision: intelligence, promotion,
prescription, invocation, application, termination and appraisal.
A functional approach to decision-making offers the student of au-
thoritative decision an alternative to the traditional more limin-
ting organic approach (popularized by Nontesquieu) which focuses
on the institutional divisions of formal government: the execu-
tive, legislature, judiciary and administration. The major short-
coming of an organic analysis is that it does not discriminate
clearly among the many different types of authoritative decision;
the same organ characteristically engages in a multiplicity of
types of decision. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision (pt. 2), 19 J. Leg.
Educ. 403, 415-37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as World Constitutive
Process II].
4. With the exception of historicalists and certain cults of
naturalism, virtually all jurisprudential schools have recognized
a distinctive policy component in prescription and, with varying
degrees of clarity, have appraised that content in terms of its
contribution to the achievement of minimum and/or optimum public
order. It was the positivism of John Austin, curiously, which
underlined the control element as one of the distinctive indicators
(in Austin's view exclusive) of prescription. J. Austin, supra
note 2, at 16-18, 24, 26. But Austin had little conception of the
authoritative component in the sense of community expectations.
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levels of interaction, the authority signal may have to
incorporate, either simultaneously or sequentially,
many different authority systems. Similarly, control
intention communications may involve complex packages
of promised indulgences and threatened deprivations
directed to different audiences. The point of emphasis
is that all three components must be copresent if we
are to speak meaningfully of law,
The relative importance, within the prescribing
function, of the control and authority components may
vary with, among other things, the type of prescription
being communicated, the level of crisis, and the nature
of the community. In an integrated community in which
authority is relatively stable and internalized in
participants, authority may be the major sustaining and
characterizing factor in prescription; behavior not
conforming to authoritative communication is likely to
cause dysphoria in the deviating actor and may trigger
autopunitive responses. In a less integrated community,
control may be the primary characterizing and sustain-
ing element of prescription. The interplay between the
authority and control elements of prescription is com-
plex and variable. 5 Anticipation of the probable means
of application of power does not necessarily lead to
expectations of authority; on the other hand, stabilized
patterns of control may tend to shape authoritative ex-
pectations. 6 In certain marginal situations, authority
may constitute the sole base value for a particular
process of prescription. This may be treated as pre-
scription only if the requisite element of control is
subsequently brought into play, thus creating in the
audience the expectation that certain behavior not only
should be followed but will indeed be required.
5. This interplay, furthermore, is frequently overlooked.
To be sure, many theorists are aware that a prescriptive theory
cannot rest on authority alone. Rather than recognizing a control
component, however, they will often fill the lacuna by turning to
further authority. See, e.g., Parsons & Shils, The Social System,
in Toward a General Theory of Action 202-03 (T. Parsons & E. Shils
ed. 1951)(social integration depends upon the internalization of
common values and the enunciation of "role expectations by occu-
pants of responsible roles").
6. See H. Lassell & A. Kaplan, Power and Society 133-34
(1921) (analysis of role of control and authority in structure and
practice of political processes).
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The concept of prescription is broader, and more
precise, than the commonly used term, legislation.
Legislation rests on an organic and structural concep-
tion, deriving from the assumption that law is made
solely or primarily by centralized legislatures. This
orientation is patently inadequate for the study of in-
ternational law with its dearth of centralized legisla-
tive bodies. Even within a more highly organized com-
munity, legislation is often no more than a procedural
label, with little or no relevance to the creation of
expectations of authority and control in the rank and
file audience to which it is directed. A significant
amount of legislation is not prescription: it is no
secret that the legislatures of certain states are
notorious for producing voluminous legislation but no
prescription. Nor does all prescription, properly so
called, derive from legislative bodies. As Maine ob-
served, to limit law to the legislature is to exclude
from scholarly focus many of the most vigorous sources
of authority; systems that do not have institutionalized
legislatures have law, but not legislation.7  Even in
systems in which there are legislatures, the abundance
of prescriptive creativity far outruns any specific
institution. The mongrel term "judicial legislation,"
for example, is so common that it no longer astonishes
our lexical sensibilities. 8  Observers and participants
accept the fact that many governmental agencies which
are not legislative make law. The point of emphasis
is that the concept of prescription allows scholarly
examination of all the processes of creating expecta-
tions about authority and control, whereas a focus on
"legislation" tends to restrict the observer to the
specific actions of a legislature.
In the global community, as in its lesser compon-
ent communities, the processes of communication by
which prescriptions are generated range from the most
formal, organized, and specialized through many grada-
tions to the most informal, unorganized, and non-
specialized.9 When prescriptive processes are most
7. H. Maine, Ancient Law 20-42 (1875).
8. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 98-
142 (1921)(legislative rules derived from judicial decision-making).
9. See, e.g., W. Sumner, Folkways (1906)(discussing the in-
formal, non-specific ways in which law.s can be made). Contemporary
sociology and social psychology, particularly role theory, are per-
meated with the suggestion of informal, unorganized and non-spe-
cialized normative systems. A writer such as Goffman has developed
extraordinary sensitivity to the most subtle codes of normative
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formal, organized, and specialized, they may be conven-
iently analyzed in terms of a sequence of four distinc-
tive steps or phases: the initiation of the process.
the exploration of relevant facts and potential poli-
cies; the choice and formulation of the policy to be
projected as authoritative for the community; and the
communication of the prescriptive content and expecta-
tions about authority and control to the target audi-
9. (continued)
behavior. See E. Goffman, Relations in Public (1971). See also
Gibbs, Norms: The Problem of Definition-and Classification, 70 Am.
J. Soc. 586 (1965). Significantly, in virtually all of this lit-
erature, though the existence of norms is taken for granted, there
appears to be no concern with how they are made, or more important,
how power is used to sustain them through time. But see M. Sherif,
The Psychology of Social Norms (1936)(study of the psychological
factors affecting the formation of social norms).
In earlier studies we sought to generalize the process b5y
which vaguely formulated customary law is made in terms of the
reciprocal claims and mutual tolerances of states in the course of
cooperative activity. See McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and
the International Law of the Seas 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 356 (1955)
(continuous interaction of nation-state decision-making is critical
to formation of law of the sea)[hereinafter cited as Hydrogren Bomb
Tests]; McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective:
Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648 (1955)(discussing
process of claim assertion and adjustment in development of law
relating to nuclear testing). In emphasizing the importance of
the expectations of the communicatees of a prescriptive message,
we indicated that it was not so much the initial claims as the
combination of such claims and reciprocal tolerances which created
the "expectations of pattern and uniformity in decision, or prac-
tice in accordance with rule, commonly regarded as law." Hydrogen
Bomb Tests, supra, at 358 n.7.
This "process of communication" description of the develop-
ment of customary law has been adopted and elaborated by a number
of subsequent writers. See K. Wolfke, Custom in Present Interna-
tional Law 63 (1964)(on development of law through continuous pro-
cess of claim assertion, appraisal, and acceptance); MacGibbon,
Customary Law and Acquiescence, 33 Brit. Y. B. Inttl L. 115 (1957)
Con role of acquiescence in development of customary rights and
obligations).
We seek here to extend this mode of description to all types
of international lawmaking. It would seem facilitative of the
rational performance of the various intellectual tasks which bot.
decision-makers and observers must perform to think of prescription
as a continual process, in which both formulated and non-formulated
components are merged, each affecting the other.
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ience. 10 Even when a prescriptive process is highly in-
formal in procedure and implicit in its communication,
some rough approximation to these phases may be observ-
ed. The most realistic description of the prescribing
function requires, however, its relation to other deci-
sion functions in the global community's more compre-
hensive process of authoritative decision.
I
Focusing on the various component functions of au-
thoritative decision should not obscure the fact that
each function contributes to the performance of every
other and that, at a microscopic level of analysis, all
decision functions are, in fact, replicated in the per-
formance of any single one. Thus, the intelligence
function delivers to the prescriber's attention the
aggregate of community goals likely to be affected or
approximated in a proposed prescription, appropriate
trend and condition data on how past efforts to secure
such goals have succeeded or failed, and possible alter-
natives in prescriptive programs, including information
about the possible social effects of such alternatives.
In its shaping of expectations about the future, empha-
sizing or de-emphasizing possible choices, intelligence
affects both demands and identities. Insofar as a
prescriber has the structural and temporal capacity to
digest and relate intelligence to the prescriptive tasks
before him, the rationality of prescription will be en-
hanced. Conversely, through prescription, intelligence
pathologies will, in the long run, be inflicted on the
larger social process.ll
The promotion function is particularly critical to
the overall performance of prescription. By facilita-
ting both formal enactment and the development of in-
formal expectations about authority and control, promo-
tion contributes the intensities in demand and, properly
10. A sequential analysis is often useful in analyzing all
decision functions. See, e.g., Lasswell, McDougal & Reisman, The
Intelligence Function and WForld Public Order, 46 Temple L.Q. 365,
368-70 (1973)(any given intelligence task can be broken dox-m into
three sequential stages).




regulated, adds new sources of information about goals,
trends, and conditions. Where promotion misfunctions,
the predominance of one or more power groups may serve
to attenuate the flow of information to prescribers and,
in extreme circumstances, may reduce the prescriber's
role to the mere formality of endorsing with tokens of
legitimacy the demands of those with naked power.
Every decision function is subject to a complex
set of authoritative expectations. Compliance with
these expectations determines, in part, the lawfulness
of the performance of that decision function within the
larger constitutive process. The prescribing function
prescribes for the other functions; that is, it is con-
stantly engaged in establishing authoritative principles
of content and procedure for the performance of all
other decision functions. Thus, for example, procedures
and substantive priorities are prescribed for the intelli-
gence function, and every phase of the promotional pro-
cess is sustained by a network of authoritative prescrip-
tions, Prescription also prescribes for itself, that is,
the prescribing function itself is subject to detailed
regulation. This ongoing internal procedure involves a
continuous feedback and reappraisal of the conformity of
actual prescriptive effects with prescriptive goals.
Both invocation and application involve the imple-
mentation of prescribed policies in social process. The
efficacy of these decision functions will thus determine
whether prescription is a controlling or merely verbal
operation. Repeated invocations and applications, whe-
ther formal or informal, may reinforce diffuse expecta-
tions and, by creating expectations of future uniformi-
ties in decision, add certainty to other indices of ex-
pectation. In particular, the way appliers ascertain,
supplement, and integrate past prescriptions very direct-
ly affects the course of future expectations about au-
thority and control, The prescriber's image of the
degree of the probable effectiveness of his own function
will obviously influence his efforts, including the so-
cial sectors which he chooses to prescribe for, the
content of prescriptions, and the sanctions provided. A
prescriber's sense of futility and meaninglessness need
not manifest itself in inactivity; it may also express
itself in wildly unrealistic prescriptions which have no
chance of implementation and which further erode commu-
nity expectations about the effectiveness of the prescrib-
ing function.
The quality of the termination function may have
subtle but important impacts on prescription. Even
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proposals for termination or failure in efforts to ter-
minate may reinforce other indices of expectation. The
realistic prescriber, oriented in a social process of
continuous change, expects a continual redefinition of
prescription. Hence he realizes that the contribution
of his function to the aggregate goal realization of the
entire decision process depends upon the subsequent
termination of many of the prescriptions to which he now
attaches high symbols of authority. In the absence of
such termination, prescriptions that were rational at
some point in the past but that are no longer so become
obstacles to goal realization and, as the power process
shifts, may engender nonauthoritative change. Such
change erodes prospectively the authority of the
prescriptive process.
The appraisal function, examining past successes
and failures, tests the aggregate performance of pre-
scription and affects predispositions about future ac-
ceptability. Where there is persistent goal deviation,
personal or structural responsibility is imputed. The
self-regulation of prescribers for effectiveness will,
hence, depend upon appropriate appraisal.
II
It should be no cause for surprise that the major
jurisprudential theories have made little contribution
to realistic description of transnational prescribing
processes.1 2 The "natural law" emphasis has been more
concerned with search for the "bases of obligation" or
"validity" of law in general than with inquiry about
the empirical paternity of particular prescriptions. 1 3
Even when it has concerned itself with particular pre
scriptions, this emphasis has encouraged the illusion
12. For a more detailed critique of the contrihutiQns of the
major jurisprudential theories of international law, see McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, Theornes About International Law: Prologue to
a Configwrative Jursprudence, 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188 (1968) (outlining
suggestions for a more viable theory of international law) [hereinafter
cited as Theori e About International Lacw.
13. The quest for "source of obligation" or "binding
character" or legitimacy, or any of the multitude of equivalents,
can quickly take on aspects of mysticism or of "infinite regress"
when not accompanied by the specification of operational referent&
in terms of the empirical expectations of community members about
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that the appropriate quest is not for the means by
which law is in fact created, but rather for the
"sources" of a law somehow mysteriously preexisting,
which the naturalist commonly locates in inaccessible
transempirical realms.14 Plainly the word "source" can
be no more than the vaguest reference to certain social
processes. In tautological fashion, the naturalist
assumes and then discovers a source, but never describes
nor explores its social dynamics.1 S
Despite its emphasis upon uniformities in behavior,
the historical approach, with its distinctive disdain
for conscious law-creating processes and concern for
mythical, national groups with inbred voltsgeisten, does
not appear to have formulated a comprehensive theory
13, (Continued)
authority and control. See Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the
Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement, 19
Mod. L. Rev. 1, 8-13 (1956)(search for source of obligation akin
to search for "a sort of will-ol-the-wisp, an ignis fatuus that only
recedes further into the distance as one approaches it, and that can
never actually be reached"J. 3ee also 'Fitzmaurice, The Law and Pro-
cedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General
Principles and Sources of Law, 30 Brit. L.B. Int'l L. 1, 8-18 C1953)
(discussing valid regulatory power of international law)[hereinafter
cited as Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justicel.
14. The word "sources" has multiple and amhiguous uses.
Briggs for example identifies (1) the "basis of international law-,"
which includes derivational exercises from assumed theories; (2)
the causes of international law, including factors such as "reason,
convenience, tradition, policy, necessity, and concepts of justice
or of social solidarity" which influence "the development of inter-
national law" but which are said, curiously, to be irrelevant to
providing "working criteria by which to distinguish law from prac-
tice or from opinions of what the law should be"; C3) the "evidences
of international law," sometimes referring to "substantive rules"
and sometimes to the "documentary sources" in which such rules find
expression; and (4) the "methods or procedures by which international
law is created," which the author prefers. The Law of Nations 43-52
(2d ed. H. Briggs 1952).
15. Grotius contributed to secularizing the notion of au-
thority with his reference to state practice and his theory that the
"impelling desire for society" constituted the source of law. Gro-
tius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis §6 at 11-12 (1925). Quoted in Theories
About International Law, supra note 12, at 223. However, Groti-us
failed to distinguish the components of authority and control im-
plicit in his conception and did not use them when performing rele-
vant juristic tasks. Some later naturalists recognized the signifi-
cance of effective power, but failed to identify a workable model
linking it with their notion of authority. See id..
1980]
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about how such uniformities create transnational expec-
tations about policy, authority, and control.1 6 The
analytical or positivistic emphasis has had understand-
able difficulty in organizing and conducting inquiry
about the creation of a kind of law whose existence it
frequently denies,17 Ignoring the realities of contem-
porary transnational prescription, this emphasis has
tremendously exaggerated the image and importance of
the autonomous nation-state, often confining law crea-
tion to the activity of state officials and stipulating
the consent of every affected state to the making of
law.18  Moreover, the positivists have commonly confused
function with structure, in insisting upon the indispen-
sability of centralized legislative bodies to the crea-
tion of "genuine" law.
Despite its concern with the causes and conse-
quences of decision, the sociological emphasis would
appear to have taken its technical concepts largely from
the analytical school and, hence, often to have succumb-
16. The historicalists offered an empirical approach in
their analysis of community, which they found to consist of "indi-
viduals interacting in a given geographical area at a minimum level
of intensity and sharing a number of critical perspectives."
Theories About InternationaZ Lzw, supra note 12, at 234. lbwever,
the historicalists failed to apply their factor analysis to an
exploration of the "manifold of social events conditioning behavior."
Id. at 240. Rather,
[t]rend projection for the historicalist is simply the
elusive assumption that the mechanisms of development
characteristic of the group spirit will continue to be
refined, and that prescriptive efforts that diverge from
group spirit will be rejected in the course of time.
Given this orientation, historicalism was not con-
cerned with strategies of invention. In the historica-
list frame of reference, the human actor is subservient
to his group and physical environment; hence any acti-
vity aimed at realizing preferences not in conformity
with the group spirit is an exercise in futility.
Id.
17. See Austin, supra note 2, at 140-42, 2Q0-01 (interna-
tional "law" not truly law because lacks determinate author).
18. See Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Custo-
mary Norms of International Laby, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 418, 427-28
(1961)(concept of customary norms contradicts generally recognized




ed to the same parochial cultural presuppositions.l9
Some of the proponents of the "realistic" emphasis
have, unhappily, carried their notions that law is only
what courts or officials do to the extreme of completely
fusing the functions of prescription and application:
there can be no authoritative community expectations
about a matter, they contend, until some judge or other
official applies them in a particular instance. 20
III
The more detailed contemporary description of the
transnational prescribing process is something of a
m'lange of these various inherited confusions. It has
become almost ritual presentation among commentators to
make Article 38 of the Statute of the International
19. Strictly speaking, there is not so much a sociological
school of international law, as a sociologistic fashion or style
of communication. The common feature of sociologistic jurispru-
dence is concern with the identification of conditioning factors and
a consensus, at least on the verbal level, that these factors are to
be found in the predispositions of the human being and various
environmental factors. The majority of sociological jurists has
sought to understand how law comes about, with little regard for the
ends and consequences of that process. In this latter respect, the
sociological perspective adds little to that of the analytic school.
Theori es About Internati~onal Law, supra note 12, at 260-61.
20. See J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 82-83, 85-86,
90-93, 101 (1909). For an application of this view, see Justice
Cardozo's opinion in New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 363, 383 (1933)
("International law ... has at times, like the common law within
states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguish-
able from morality or justice, until at length the inpI-lmateur of a
court attests its jural quality.")
The legal realist school was in many ways a flamboyant ex-
pression of sociological jurisprudence, but it was more concerned
with ends and more polemical and iconoclastic than its parent move-
ment. Current international realists such as Carlston and Ross,
see, e.g., K. Carlston, Law and Organization in World Society C1962)
and A. Ross, Constitution of the-United Nations: Analysis of Struc-
ture and Function (1950), are distinguished by the strong behavior-
alist strands in their work, by their emphasis on operations and
control, and by their continuing gnawing doubt about the existence
of international law.
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Court of Justice, a specification of the competence of
the court, the central focus of exposition. This Arti-
cle is commonly regarded as of the "highest authority"
and as expressing "the duty of any tribunal which is
called -upon to administer international law." 21 It may
be recalled that the Article reads:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether genexal
or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
2, This provision shall not prejudice the power
of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et
bono, if the parties agree theretoZ2
Once, however, this focus is established, all agree-
ment among commentators ends. It is furiously debated
whether the itemization of "sources" is comprehensive;
what the priorities, if any, are among the different
sources; whether different sources are "formal" or
"material"; what the precise wording in the different
itemizations of the Article means; and how the signi-
ficance of each itemized source is to be determined and
assessed in particular instances of controversy.23
Unhappily, amidst all this debate, little attention is
given to the difficult intellectual tasks confronting
decisionmakers or observers in the common case in which
21, J. Brierly, The Law.r of Nations 56 C6th- ed. 19,631,
22. 'United Nations, Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 38.
23. For discussion of this debate, see K. Raman, Prescrip-
tion of International Law By Customary Practice 697 n,29 (1967)
(unpublished thesis in Yale La.r School Library).
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the sources are ambiguous, incomplete, or contradictory
or in which they create expectations inimical to basic
community policy.
The initial itemization of "international conven-
tions" prompts some commentators to champion agreements
as an important "direct, conscious, and purposive"24
modality for law creation, offering the closest approach
to the deliberate and explicit formulations of legisla-
tive processes in national societies. From this per-
spective, agreements may be both "formal" for the par-
ties and others, and "material" or "evidentiary" sources
of the expectations about authority and control which
comprise customary law. Other commentators, however,
find it difficult to understand how agreements, which in
some versions of inherited international myth are sup-
posed to "bind" only the immediate parties, can create
"obligation" for third parties. Posing the problem as
a quest for "consent" rather than for empirical expec-
tations about the probable course of future decision,
such commentators distinguish between the creation of
"law" and the creation of "obligations," and insist
that even agreements can derive their "binding" quality
only from "a rule of customary law to that effect."25
This would appear greatly to subordinate agreements to
custom as an exclusive law creating modality.
The infelicities in expression of Article 38's
reference to "international custom" are paralleled en-
tirely by the imprecision of the conception which it
seeks to communicate. The greatest difficulty for both
decision makers and scholars is distinguishing the usage
or practice that is mere extra-legal habit from the cus-
tom that carries expectations of general community au-
thority and control. The comprehensive process of co-
operative behavior through which expectations about au-
thority and control are engendered is commonly truncated
into two relatively exclusive "elements": a "material',
24. L. Oppenheim, The Future of International Law 24 (1921).
See J. Brierly, supra note 21, at 51 (positivism teaches that in-
ternational law is sum of rules to which states have consented);
M. Hudson, International Legislation xv-xvi (1931)(international
law stems, inter aZia, from agreements).
25. C. Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International
Law 53 (1968). See Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 13, at 68.
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element in a flow of behavior and a "subjective" ele-
ment in a variously conceived opinio juris. There is,
however, unending debate about 1) the degree of general-
ity and uniformity a practice must have attained, in-
cluding its geographical and temporal dimensions, 2)
the content of the subjectivities (whether of preexist-
ing law, mere ethics, unlawfulness, etc.) which must be
established and 3) whether these subjectivities are re-
quired to be established by evidence independent of the
behavior of the participants. 2 6 There is increasing
argument about the relevance of resolutions of the Uni-
ted Nations General Assembly for establishing opinio
juris, and both proposals and rejections of "instant"
custom abound. 27 It is sometimes suggested, in complete
contradiction of the flow of decision and expectation,
that the only relevant practice is the practice of
states and that the other important participants in
transnational processes of effective power do not share
in the creation of customary law.28  Finally, it is oc-
casionally insisted, conversely to the argument noted
above about agreement, 29 that custom is not an indepen-
dent mode of law creation, but rather requires a unani-
mous consent which makes it tantamount to explicit
agreement. 30
The provision for recourse to "the general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations" has been no
26. For an extensive discussion of the contours of the de-
bate and each of the enumerated points, see Raman, supra note 23,
at 275-371, 433-36, 482-545, 667-86.
27. See, e.g., J. Castaneda, Legal Effects of United Na-
tions Resolutions 168-77 (1969)(organs as broadly representative as
General Assembly are particularly well qualified to determine when
practices have become principles of international law); H. Bokor-
Szego, The Role of the United Nations in International Legislation
49-67 (1978)(despite fact that resolutions of international organi-
zations have no binding force, they are significant in effecting
changes in process of custom formation and in establishing new
norms through custom).
28. See Customary Norms., supra note 18 at 421, 423-26
("Opinio jwris signifies that the states treat this or that custo-
mary norm as juridically binding"); Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions §1, Comment d, (1965)(where U.N. organs exercise lawmaking
functions, such exercise constitutes concerted action of member
states and not of an international entity).
29. See p. 261 supra.
30. See Tunkin, Theory of International Law 118-23, 126-28
(1974) (recognition by states is essential to legal status of custom).
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less variously interpreted. Sometimes these principles
are presented as natural law absolutes "having such
inherent validity that they cannot be either contested
or dispensed with" in any legal system, 3 1 sometimes as
mere distillates of the more essential notions found in
national law systems, and sometimes, overlapping with
custom, as generalizations derived from the repetitive
behavior of international and national officials. 3 2 It
is simultaneously doubted whether there are any such
principles, or whether any such principles as may be
asserted are "law," or whether they constitute a dis-
tinctive source of law.3 3 Sometimes it is insisted that
the adjective "civilized" is invidious and unnecessary
and that reference may be made to the practice of all
states; 3 4 at other times it is suggested that only the
practice of the more mature and developed states is
relevant. 3 5 In this day of contending systems of world
public order it is occasionally urged that shared prin-
ciples are not likely to be found in the practice of
states belonging to "two opposing social systems," and
that "in consequence of the emergence of the socialist
countries and the new states of Africa and Asia, the
developmental base of general international law has
contracted." 3 6 More positively, it is sometimes recog-
nized that one function of the authorization of recourse
to "general principles" is to afford a decision maker or
other evaluator some latitude of creativity in supple-
menting or modifying "positive law"3 7 : the decision maker
31. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources
of Law, in Symbolae Verzijl 154 (1958).
32. See Customary Norms, supra note 18, at 419 ("Histori-
cally a customary norm of international law appears as a result of
reiterated actions of states"); Raman, supra note 23, at 149-245
(detailed treatment of participation of nation-states in formation
of international law).
33. G. Herczegh, General Principles of Law and the Inter-
national Legal Order 24 (1969)(noted Western authors question the
existence of "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations"); Parry, supra note 25, at 84 (questioning whether "general
principles" are a distinct source of law "at all").
34. Herczegh, supra note 33, at 11 n.2.
35. B. Cheng, General Principles of Law 25 (1953).
36. Tunkin, supra note 30, at 34.
37. See Herczegf, supra note 33, at 34 (general legal princi-
ples affect the interpretation and application of law and may be used
to fill-in gaps in positive law),
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is to be "permitted to reason, though not to legislate"
by the "application of analogies."8
The traditional interpretations of the authoriza-
tions for recourse to "judicial decisions" as "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law"3 9 would
appear to undercut the importance in fact of the role of
uniformities in adjudicative decisions, whether interna-
tional or national, in creating parallel uniformities in
expectations aboit authority and control which transcend
national boundaries. It is commonly agreed that such
decisions are "material" sources of law, but frequently
questioned "whether they constitute formal sources of
law."'40 In conventional myth, as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
writes, "Judges . . . declare or formulate or clarify or
interpret or apply, or possibly develop the law; but they
do not create change or repeal it: that is for the
legislature."4 1 The illusion is sometimes entertained,
even by the highest authorities, that if a national court,
in a case properly before it, declares what it thinks
international law is or ought to be, it is engaging in
unwarranted, unilateral lawmaking for the whole globe. 42
Additional confusion is caused by the stipulation in
Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice that "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case." Such an attempt to limit the impact of
judicial decisions ignores the fact that even in the
absence of a technical doctrine of precedent or stare
decisis, judges, like other rational beings, commonly make
reference to the lessons of past experience, and that the
members of the communities they represent expect this of
them. In light of these confusions, it is understandable
that little has been done to develop appropriate princi-
ples of content and procedure for appreciating the genuine
contribution of adjudicative decisions to the creation of
transnational expectations about authority and control.
38. Parry, supra note 25, at 83.
39. Art. 38, para. l(d). See p. 260 supra.
40. Fitzmaurice, Some Pooblems Regarding the Formal Sources of
Law in Symbolae Verzijl 168-69 (1958)(where decisions of domestic
tribunals are binding, they are formal sources of law, but where, as
with international tribunals, decisions have no precedential force
they are merely material sources of law).
41. Id. at 169.
42. This illusion permeates Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for
the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Cf. Tunkin, supra note 30, at 184.
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The teachings of "the most highly qualified publi-
cists of the various nations" cause less difficulty; it
appears generally agreed that these are indeed "subsid-
iary means- for the determination of rules of law.''4 3
Despite the flow of great books through the centuries
and their repeated invocation and employment in instances
of controversy, the writings of publicists are uniformly
relegated to such categories as "material sources" or
"Imere evidences," It is also sometimes noted that the
doctors often disagree.
The provision for decision "ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto," seldom explicitly invoked in
practice, has caused commentators some difficulty in
effecting its reconciliation with an evaluator's crea-
tivity and more general freedom to appreciate other
sources. 44 Thus, one writer has insisted that because
of the stipulation for agreement of the parties, the
International Court of Justice is not otherwise author-
ized to invoke the test of "reasonableness" in its com-
prehensive evaluation of the options in decision before
it: only "intermediate decision makers" may have re-
course to reasonableness.45 Another scholar has sug-
gested that decision ex aequo et bono in this context
may refer to the possibility of some 'kind of political
or compromise determination, beyond the considerable
equitable discretion that the Court has in its applica-
tion of the law to almost any conceivable case.4b The
author of a recent monograph suggests that "in opposition
to the strict explication of legal rules equity means a
balance and compensation of the interests of the liti-
gants and has a function in mitigating the rigour of
legal provisions rather than in filling the gaps of
law. ,47
In light of the developments of recent decades, the
most striking omission from the itemization in Article
38 is, of course, that of reference to the role of
international governmental organizations in the
43. Art. 38, para. l(d). See p. 260 supra,
44. Cf. M. Habicht, The Power of the International Judge to
Give a Decision "Ex Aequo et Rono" 67-69 (1935)(ex aequo et bono
is extraordinary procedure that allows judge to base his decision
exclusively on considerations of equity).
45. NacGibbon, supra note 9, at 134.
46. Ascribed by senior author to R. Y. Jennings and confirmed
by Prof. Jennings in telephone conversation, Cambridge, England,
Dec. 20, 1980 (on file with Yale Studies in Wlorld Pu lic Order).
47. Herczegh, supra note 33, at 101.
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creation of both explicitly formulated law and custom-
ary expectations, It is increasingly recognized that
these organizations, and especially the United Nations,
contribute to the creation of international law in many
different ways and that any realistic description of
transnational prescribing processes must take this con-
tribution into account.48 The contribution of such
organizations, through the performance of the intelli-
gence and recommending functions, the maintenance of
established structures of authority, and the making of
law through explicit agreement is of long standing know-
ledge. More recently, awareness has grown that the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations, though explicitly
endowed with only a recommending function, has, in aug-
mentation of traditional processes of customary crea-
tion, come to provide a relatively universal parliamen-
tary forum in which the peoples of the world can deli-
berately, with whatever comprehensiveness and precision
they desire, proclaim what they think the law to be.
Whether any particular resolution embodies the expecta-
tions about future decision necessary to constitute
prescription must of course depend upon many variables,
including the number and effective power of the states
voting for and against the resolution, the compatibility
of the policy content of the resolution with prior cus-
tomary and conventional expectations and other contem-
porary communications, and the measures subsequently
taken or not taken to put the resolutions into effective
practice.
As indicated in the references above to "general
principles" and "ex aequo et bono," some contemporary
descriptions offer at least modest recognition that a
decision-maker or observer, confronted with opposing
claims about the content and authority of relevant pre-
scription, must commonly consider and assess not merely
some single source or tidbit of prescription, but the
whole range or flow of sources and outcomes in prescrip-
tion, and that these multiple sources and outcomes are
often incomplete, ambiguous, and contradictory in their
messages. Thus, Professor Brierly, in an eloquent discus-
sion of "The place of 'reason' in the modern system,"
48. See Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the
General Assembly_ 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 782 (1966)(General Assembly
is endowed with and actually exercises a limited international
legislative power); Cf. A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in In-
ternational Law 3-4 (1971)(United Nations resolutions not usually




IN]o system of law consists only of
formulated rules, for these can never be
sufficiently detailed or sufficiently
foreseeing to provide for every situation
that may call for a legal decision; those
who administer law must meet new situations
not precisely covered by a formulated rule
by resorting to the principle which medieval
writers would have called natural law, and
which we generally call reason. Reason in
this context does not mean the unassisted
reasoning powers of any intelligent man, but
a 'judicial' reason, which means that a
principle to cover the new situation is dis-
covered by applying methods of reasoning
which lawyers everywhere accept as valid,
for example, the consideration of precedents,
the finding of analogies, the disengagement
from accidental circumstances of the
principles underlying rules of law already
established. 49
Similarly, Bin Cheng writes: "In place of the
theory of the logical plenitude or self-sufficiency of
the positive law, the modern theory maintains that the
positive law has always been and always should be guid-
ed, supplemented and perhaps even corrected by an un-
formulated law."tS0 Kopelmanas appropriately emphasizes
the high creativity in a finding of "custom": "We have
already seen that the formation and existence of a cus-
tom depend on its conformity with the social needs of
a legal order."Sl He adds, "Sometimes it is merely the
satisfactory and reasonable character of the custom
which allows a decision whether a particular rule has
or has not the character of a legal rule."'5 2 More re-
cently, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has queried whether
"exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the
normal rules"5 3 and pointed to the fact that the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries
49. J. Brierly, Law of Nations 66 (6th ed. 1963).
50. a. Cheng, supra note 35, at 16-17.
51. Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of Creation of Interna-
tional Law, 18 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 127, 148 (1937).
52. Id. at 151.
53. Law and Procedure of the International Court of .Justice,
supra note 13, at 18.
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case, 54 in its finding and application of customary law
"based its Judgment very largely on such factors as
the exceptional character of Norway's coast, the marked
dependence of the population of northern Norway on fish-
ing, and so on."'55 Unfortunately, however, this frank,
if inconclusive and undeveloped, discussion of the dif-
ferent tasks confronting an applier or other evaluator
of alleged prescription is still too often beclouded by
abstruse infusions of a mystifying doctrine of non liquet
and by fears that too explicit recognition of the crea-
tive necessities in decision would, in the contemporary
decentralized world arena, impose too great a burden
upon judges. 56
Moreover, these commentators fail to recognize that
the formulas of Article 38 are misleading not only be-
cause they direct the inquirer to an ambiguous and capri-
ciously limited array of sources from which international
law is alleged to derive, but even more seriously because
they suggest to the inquirer that he or she may regard
whatever emanates from these sources as, in fact, law.
But this assurance may, in particular contexts, be be-
lied by other communications or signals about authority
and control. The product of a particular source may
well be syntactic illusion, bearing little relation to
genuine community expectations,
IV
One possible route of escape from our inherited con-
fusions about prescription and its application lies both
in the more explicit recognition and contextual descrip-
tion of the contemporary comprehensive process of trans-
national prescription, and in a more careful discrimina-
tion and specification of the several different intel-
lectual tasks which must be performed by any applier or
other evaluator who is confronted with an alleged pres-
cription.
The diversity and abundance of the processes of
communication by which prescriptions, that is, the pro-
jections of policy attended by expectations of authority
54. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J.
116.
55. Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
supra note 13, at 18-19.
56. See J. Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the
International Comunity, 35 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 124, 152 (1959).
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and control, are created in the contemporary world
arena are staggering. The peoples of the world communi-
cate to each other expectations about policy, authority,
and control, not merely through state or intergovernmen-
tal organs, but through reciprocal claims and mutual
tolerances in all their interactions. The participants
in the relevant processes of communication, the communi-
cators and the communicatees, range from the most spec-
ialized to the least specialized in prescription, and
include not merely the officials of states and inter-
governmental organizations but also the representatives
of political parties, pressure groups, private associa-
tions, and the individual human being qua individual,
with all his or her identifications.
The perspectives of participants include those
both most deliberately and least deliberately related
to prescriptive purposes, and exhibit demands, identifi-
cations, and expectations with every degree of compati-
bility or incompatibility with common interests and
basic general community policies. The situations of
interaction and communication are both official and non-
official, organized and unorganized. The organized sit-
uations include the familiar diplomatic, parliamentary-
diplomatic, parliamentary, adjudicative, and executive
arenas and all situations are characerized by differing
degrees of institutionalization, temporal duration,
geographic range, and expectations of crisis. The dif-
ferent participants bring many varying base values, 57 in
terms of authority and controlling power, to bear upon
particular interactions. The strategies employed by
participants in the management of their base values dis-
play every possible degree of explicitness or implicit-
ness in relation to prescription, range along the whole
spectrum of coercion and persuasion, and include, not
merely the modalities suggested in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, but the
entire complex of procedures employed in the varying
types of power arenas and all the strategies character-
istic of the different value processes. The culminating
outcomes of all this communication represent a very
great range both in the facts about shared perspectives
in relation to policy, authority, and control and in the
57. Any value cherished in a community may, of course, serve
as a base of power, as well as be a demanded value. See McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
Decision (pt. 1), 19 J. Leg. Educ. 253, 289-300 (1967). For an
illumination of the concept of base value, see H, Lasswell & A.
Kaplan, Supra note 6, at 83-84,
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evidences of such perspectives in the shape of explicit
formulations and unarticulated assumptions. The most
important point is that the outcomes in shared expecta-
tions, in whatever degree they approach prescription
and however they may be evidenced, are a function of
the total configuration of factors that affect and pro-
duce them.
From this perspective of the process by which in-
ternational law is made, it is now possible to identify
in a more discriminating and precise fashion the ines-
capable intellectual operations performed by any evalu-
ator, including members of a target audience and especi-
ally official appliers of alleged prescription. It may
be emphasized that the subjectivities of communicatees
are an indispensable component of prescription and that
authoritative appliers are important members of the tar-
get audience of prescription. It is impossible to de-
scribe prescription comprehensively without making refer-
ence to application, since the subjectivities of ap-
pliers are a necessary component of prescription. Any
realistic description of a process of prescriptive com-
munication requires reference, beyond the strategies
and subjectivities of communicators, to the subjectivi-
ties of the communicatees and the intellectual opera-
tions incumbent upon them. It is suggested that these
operations may be conveniently categorized in three-fold
fashion. 58
(1) Ascertaining expectations about content,
authority and control
This task requires a genuine effort to achieve the
closest possible approximation to the effective aggre-
gate general community expectation about the content,
authority, and control of alleged prescriptive communi-
cations. The adequate performance of this task demands
a disciplined systematic survey and assessment of all
features of the process o5 communication and its con-
text that may affect expectation. The task and proced-
ures are substantially comparable whether the expecta-
tions sought are those of the general community, of some
lesser regional community, of simply a number of parti-
cipants, or even of the immediate parties to a contro-
versy.
58. These operations are, of course, integral goals of the
application function. See McDougal, Hwnan Rights and WorZd Public
Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General
Conmunity Policies, 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 387, 394-96 (1974).
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C2) Supplementing incomplete and ambiguous
communications
This task requires the remedying of the inevitable
gaps and ambiguities in prescriptive expectation by
reference to more general, basic community policies
about the shaping and sharing of values. In convention-
al presentations this task is sometimes described as the
exercise of "reason" or the invocation of analogies.
Its adequate performance demands, however, the disci-
plined employment of a comprehensive set of procedures,
including: specifying each of the opposing claims about
prescription in terms of the interests sought to be
protected and the particular demands for authoritative
decision; formulating the different options open to the
relevant decision-maker or other evaluator (which may be
more extensive than the decisions demanded by the oppos-
ing parties); estimating the consequences of alternative
choices upon the aggregate inclusive interests of the
general community and the exclusive interests of the
particular parties; and choosing the option which prom-
ises to promote the largest aggregate long-term common
interest, inclusive and exclusive.
C3) Integrating expectations with basic
community policies
This task requires decision-makers or other evalu-
ators, recognizing that they are responsible for the
total policy of the community which they represent or
of which they are members, to reject even the most ex-
plicit, precisely formulated expectations when such
expectations are inimical to basic, more intensely
demanded community policies. This task is made authori-
tative with respect to international agreements both by
the newly formulated constitutive prescription about jus
cogens and by the rapidly emerging global Bill of Human
Rights. The considerations that prompted the making of
the prescription for international agreements apply,
however, no less cogently to the less deliberately for-
mulated prescriptions of customary law. The adequate
performance Of this task demands procedures comparable
to those recommended for supplementing expectations,
with explicit specification of the more intensely de-
manded general community policies and deliberate rejec-
tion of any prescriptive intimations that contravene
these policies.
Effective performance of these three operations,
and indeed of any decision component, requires the
application of a series of interrelated intellectual
tasks, including: suggesting the broad policies appro-
priate for a global prescribing process, examining the
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degrees of approximation to the policies in past trends
in practice, identifying the factors that appear to
have affected past practice, projecting possible future
patterns in practice, and recommending possible improve-
ments in constitutive prescribing structures and proced-
ures.5 9 Part V of this Article focuses on the first of
these tasks; it offers a provisional specification of
appropriate policies for the global prescribing func-
tion.O
V
Students of the prescribing function frequently ask
of a particular norm if it is "good law," that is, they
seek to appraise a prescription for its consonance with
the common interests of the relevant community. But
there is an anterior question, which is larger and more
enduring than the question of the quality of a particu-
lar norm. It is the clarification of basic community
policy for the making of prescriptions at the constitu-
tive level. This anterior question recognizes that the
prescribing function in any community is part of its
more comprehensive constitutive process, and thus
focuses not on the content of particular norms, but on
the process by which such norms are made.
The focus upon constitutive process is not a theo-
retical exercise, From time to time, international
lawyers have the opportunity to participate in a major
and explicit "constitutional" case in which basic poli-
cies about lawmaking itself are considered and perhaps
changed. Key issues in the Certain Expenses case 61 and
in the Namibia case, 62 for example, were whether parti-
cipation in international lawmaking within the United
Nations should be extended from the restricted member-
ship club of the Security Council to the more inclusive
59. A more detailed exposition of these intellectual tasks
is offered in Theories About InternationaZ Law, supra note 12, at
204-06.
60. What we seek is the specification, rather than the deri-
vation, of relevant policies. See Theories About International Law,
supra note 11, at 207.
61. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Na-
tions, [1962] I.C.J. 151.
62. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)




General Assembly, In addition to these dramatic cases,
virtually every controversy and all practice has a con-
stitutive dimension in which the question of prescrip-
tion and its structuring is inherent, The lawyer cannot
effectively perceive and exploit these opportunities and
the scholar cannot appraise the choices made without a
clarification and specification of the basic community
policies pertinent to the prescribing function, The
most general question is what basic policies would we
wish to see implemented if it were possible to design
an optimum prescriptive process,
The securing of appropriate world public order,
minimum and optimum, requires the establishment and
maintenance of a prescriptive process whose outcomes--
norms prescribed and potential norms rejected--are effec-
tive, rational, and inclusive. Effectiveness does not
require the absolute application of every norm. Rather,
it imports the maintenance of a contextually appropriate
level of uniformity and stability in interaction which
is substantially consistent with and popularly attributed
to expectations of control as well as of authority.
Rationality demands that prescriptions express common
rather than special interests, with an appropriate balanc-
ing of protection for both inclusive and exclusive inter-
ests. 63 Inclusivity requires that prescriptions extend
to all interactions, whoever the participants and what-
ever the geographical locus of activity, insofar as the
interactions affect common interests. The achievement of
effective, rational, and inclusive prescriptions depends
upon an aggregate process, each feature of which is
structured so that it contributes to the preferred out-
comes. Hence, we consider seriatim the policies for each
feature which may be instrumental to achieving prescrip-
tive outcomes facilitative of a world order of human
dignity.
A. Partia$pants
The policy stipulating a wide sharing of power for
each decision function in the constitutive process applies
equally to the prescribing process. Every participant
affected by the outcomes of decision processes should
have the opportunity to influence their content, while no
participant or small group of participants should be
allowed to prevent others from prescribing in the common
interest. We reject the seductively simple doctrine of
a unanimity requirement which, under the guise of the
63. See p. 275 infra.
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maximum sharing of power, vouchsafes a veto to an en-
trenched minority and enfranchises a single participant
or a small group with the power to paralyze both the
formal and informal prescriptive processes of an entire
community. Such a veto in fact involves a concentration
rather than a wide sharing of power and should be
eschewed in all but the most exceptional circumstances.
A commitment to a representative prescriptive pro-
cess cannot be translated into a general and unswerving
loyalty to a particular set of political institutions or
practices. The test of any institution or practice is
the degree to which it provides maximum possible parti-
cipation within the specific context, having due regard
for the shifting complex of policies necessary to the
maintenance of the desired public order. Hence, prefer-
ences for such specialized institutions as referendum,
proportional representation, varying formulas of weight-
ed voting, and direct and indirect democracy must always
turn upon a contemporary and particular correlation of
basic policy and context.
The informality of many parts of the transnational
prescriptive process, in which expectations about poli-
cies, authority, and control are created by both offi-
cial and non-official cooperative behavior, often yields
an appropriate inclusivity. When this inclusivity is
achieved, such processes present a preferred democracy
and representativeness in that they involve a constant
accommodation of the interests and behavior of all parti-
cipants who are affected by the prescriptions being
created. But neither in procedure nor substance does
custom assure prescriptions in conformity with minimum
or maximum order needs of human dignity; there are, un-
fortunately, no rational, invisible hands that automa-
tically guide social interaction toward desired values.
Hence, the application of a customary prescriptive pro-
cess may require the same supplementation and policing
as does the application of more formal prescriptions.
Customary processes do, nevertheless, often provide a
higher degree of democracy and representativeness than
do many more formal prescribing processes.
B. Perspectives
The perspectives appropriate to the rich diversity
of potential lawmaking activities in the contemporary
global arena range between two extremes in consciousness
of lawmaking. On the one hand, prescription refers to
those activities deliberately and manifestly designed to
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make law, such as attend participation in multilateral
agreements or formal bilateral agreements. Yet, it also
includes those activities least deliberately so designed,
indeed even those manifestly purporting to flout the
products of past prescribing processes, no less than
those accompanied by ex gratia disclaimers.
The perspectives of community members, that is, the
objectives for which they establish and maintain the con-
stitutive process, have been appropriately considered a
crucial element in prescription. Indeed, a certain con-
stellation of perspectives about policy, authority, and
control is what is commonly meant by prescription. Even
traditional theories about the making of international
law have seldom pushed to the extreme of behavioralism,
with emphasis exclusively upon externally observable
operations. But the uncontrovertible statement that sub-
jectivities are important in both process and outcomes
of lawmaking is not enough. What is required Beyond
this explicit recognition of the relevance of perspec-
tives is a more detailed specification of the demands,
identifications, and expectations appropriate to a pre-
ferred prescribing process.
1. Demands
An observer may characterize the claims of states
and other participants--however they justify themselves
--in terms of common or special interests. The former
serve the interests of the entire world community; the
latter do not, but are asserted irrespective of the in-
terests of others. Where demands for comparatively high
or complete national control serve the interests of the
world community, we term them common exclusive interests
to distinguish them from both special interests and
claims for more inclusive or shared control. In a public
order aspiring toward human dignity, the demands of par-
ticipants in transnational prescriptive processes must
achieve, above all, a commitment to common interests and
a rejection of special interests. It is within this
broad commitment that an accommodation must be sought be-
tween the inclusive interests of many participants and
the exclusive interests of particular participants.
Demands for particular policies--even about common
interests--may vary in their intensity; intense recogni-
tion of common interests in certain standards, such as
those relating to minimum order, is a prerequisite to com-
munity. This category of most intense demands includes
the emerging legal formula of jus cogens, with its insis-
tence upon the overriding necessities of controlling un-
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authorized violence and coercion and the very recent con-
ventions concerning the basic human rights of the individ-
ual. We urge explicit recognition and continuous appraisal
of such preemptory demands, testing them through time for
their instrumentality and utility in the achievement of
minimum and optimum order in particular contexts.
2. Ident-ficati~ons
Social interaction is not discrete; it is physically
continuous and psychically integrated. Hence, individual
performance in the most nuclear of exclusive groups may
significantly determine perceptions and performance in
other groups of increasing inclusivity. Because the con-
ception of human dignity that we recommend involves, per-
force, the widest participation in the shaping and sharing
of all values, it is often arenas of primary and direct
rather than secondary and representative interaction that
determine the level of human dignity an individual can
achieve. For this reason, policies about appropriate
identifications for prescriptive functions should avoid
emphasizing either inclusive or exclusive identifications
at the expense of the other. What is required is an
appropriate balance, permitting the individual to recog-
nize that the realization of the common interests of the
most comprehensive community of which he is a part is a
function of his routine operations in diverse groups of
varying inclusivity or exclusivity, and vice versa. Iden-
tification with the most comprehensive inclusive community
thus does not import repudiation of membership and loyalty
in the many less inclusive groups in which the individual's
life transpires; it may, however, require revisions in the
priority and intensity of the diverse loyalties of the
self-system,
3. Expectations
At every level of social interaction, the policy
content people seek to prescribe and the techniques they
employ to assemble and communicate the authority and con-
trol components of prescription are deeply affected by
the matter-of-fact expectations they entertain, As in
the performance of every other decision function, we
urge that matter-of-fact expectations about social pro-
cess, effective power and authoritative decision he
made realistic and contextual, Such realism and con-
textuality can avoid the Scylla of cynical despair over
possibilities of prescribing changes in the world arena
and the Charybdis of giddy -utopianism which assumes that
every necessary change can be effected by prescription.
Realistic expectations can aid in the identification of
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proper targets and the setting of appropriate timetables.
Prescribers who do not orient themselves realistically
and contextually in the manifold of events of which they
are part and which they seek to effect, sacrifice not
only the potential effectiveness of their own purposive
behavior but, in the aggregate, enlarge the gap between
authority and control, enervating and ultimately extin-
guishing the process of authoritative decision within
which they operate. An effective intelligence function
is indispensable to an effective prescribing function.
C. Arenas
Prescription is an interactive communicative pro-
cess; the features of the situations in which it takes
place--structural, temporal, geographical, or spatial--
have subtle but pervasive and important impacts on out-
comes as well as pre-outcome phases. Hence, it is im-
portant to project a complex of preferred policies for
prescriptive arenas so that advantage may be taken of
every potential in the management of situational fea-
tures.
1. Organized and Unorganized Arenas
The assumption that organized institutions always
perform tasks more efficiently than the non-organized is
incorrect. Any rational effort toward improving the
global prescribing process must appropriately balance
both organized and unorganized arenas. The tremendous
potentialities of the United Nations bodies, the
specialized agencies, the regional organizations, and
specially organized multilateral conferences for the
clarification and articulation of common interests have
scarcely begun to be exploited. At the same time, both
scholars and general community decision makers must take
fuller and more positive account of the generation of
customary law in the many unorganized arenas of the
global process.
Every interaction of even the most minimal duration
generates, reinforces, and changes onets expectations
and demands on oneself and others regarding the full
range of values being shaped and shared. Accordingly,
a comprehensive theory of prescription cannot limit its
focus to those organized situations which are specialized
to lawmaking and dismiss the vast range of unorganized
interactions in which customary expectations are created
and sustained, Indeed, unorganized prescriptive arenas
have, as already emphasized, often played an important
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function in democratizing the lawmaking function. It
is important that the authority of unorganized as well
as organized prescriptive situations be recognized in
order that assessments of law for both scholarly and
decision-making purposes take full account of all situ-
ations in which authoritative expectations are shaped.
We recommend, further, clear recognition of the
distinction between public order and civic order, the
latter being a domain which is consciously demarked and
reserved for relatively autonomous private decision.64
Contextual investigation has shown that the maximum
policy dividend in human dignity is gained by permitting
participants themselves to regulate a large sector of
their lives. This maximum realization of human dignity
is assured only if delimitations of public and civic
order are made after the full range of actual prescrip-
tive situations is examined.
2. Specialized and Non-Specialized Prescriptive
Arenas
Analytical positivistic categories of jurispruden-
tial thought have often attempted to restrict attention
to a limited number of specialized prescriptive arenas
as'the exclusive sources from which "law" comes. As
Eugen Ehrlich emphatically showed, however, any scholar
who has limited his attention to certain ritualized ac-
tivities of a legislature has covered only a minuscule
segment of the creative processes by which expectations
about policy, authority, and control are generated in
social interaction.65  Jurisprudential dogmatics aside,
no serious observer limits attention to a single special-
ized prescriptive organ. "Judicial lawmaking" and
such open-ended terms as custom, "general principles,"
and precedent force attention to a number of other pre-
scriptive processes. As indicated above,66 prescription
need not be a specialized or purposive process, Because
the creation of expectations is a consequence ancillary
to almost all relatively stable interaction, a plenary
conception of prescription cannot limit itself to so-
called specialized prescriptive arenas. We therefore
recommend that attention be directed to all interactive
64. For development of the concept of civic order (the areas
of life in which the individual is subjected to the least public or
private coercion), see M. McDougal, H1. Lasswell & L, Chen, Human
Rights and World Public Order 801 (1980); Zee also R. Arens &
H. Lasswell, In Defense of Public Order 204-05 (1961).
65. E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of
Law 20-22 (1962).
66. See p. 252 supra.
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situations in which expectations about value allocation
are prescribed.
3. Centralized and Decentralized Arenas
Policies of representativeness, if they are to
achieve their maximum realization without jeopardizing
minimum world order, must accommodate prescriptive pro-
cesses of varying degrees of organization transpiring in
a broad range of geographical arenas, from the most cen-
tralized to the most decentralized. The social tendency
of interacting individuals to generate reciprocal expec-
tations relating to all the value exchanges involved in
their specific interactions should roceive authoritative
encouragement in direct proportion to the degree of ex-
clusivity of impact of their relations. The maximum
direct and representative participation of all actors
will be realized only if the prescriptive competence of
the most decentralized arenas is fully employed. As the
inclusivity of a flow of interactions increases, however,
either in terms of direct participation or the diffusion
of value effects, the competence of a more centralized
prescriptive process should be recognized.
Recognition of the prescriptive creativity of all
social interactions of minimum duration does not mean
that the observer or decision-maker must accept the au-
thority of all. The determination of aiX arena of author-
itative prescription, whatever its degree of centraliza-
tion or decentralization, is a function of constitutive
decision and is taken with full regard for the unique
features of the context as well as for the plenary range
or policies of the community in question. The flexibil-
ity of both observers and constitutive decisionmakers
will be enhanced, however, by cognizance of the full
range of arenas which are available.
4. The Integration of Universal and Regional
Arenas
Intimately related to the policy of balancing cen-
tralized and decentralized arenas is the crucial consti-
tutive policy of integrating universal and regional
arenas into a coherent aggregate global process of pre-
scription that promotes an ongoing dynamic responsiveness
to the changing requirements of common interest. Over-
lapping and intersecting arenas, conveniently described
as universal and regional, but often involving a richer
geographical and interest variation, are constantly
creating expectations; the challenge is to determine the
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sectors in which prescriptive authority should be ac-
corded to varying geographic and interest levels and
constantly to appraise allocations of prescriptive com-
petence in terms of the extent to which they realize in-
clusive goals and are productively integrated within the
most comprehensive global community process. Fundamen-
tal policy recommendations aTe, then, the recognition of
the prescriptive competence of diverse geographical
arenas, the determination of such allocations on the
basis of common interests, and the integration of pre-
scriptive competence for value and spatial sectors in a
manner most consonant with the interests of the world
community.
5. Continuous and Intermittent Institutions
In the world community, as in any lesser community,
the aggregate flow of prescriptions must be continuous
if it is to respond effectively to the challenges of an
ever-changing social and environmental context. Hence,
we recommend the institutionalization of continuous pre-
scriptive processes. A preference for continuity does
not exclude allowance for and recognition of an authori-
tative prescriptive competence for intermittent processes
which arise because of specific stimuli and, under cer-
tain circumstances, present the optimum form for proced-
ural and substantial policy realization. Past practice
has sought to meet this policy requirement within the
limitations of its formal theory by indirect and often
sub rosa recognition of the prescriptive competence of
decision-makers who are not formally authorized to pre-
scribe. Hence, the praetor was permitted his periodic
edicts; in contemporary practice, the inevitable "legis-
lative" role of the judge is recognized. These partial
and informal recognitions of an intermittent prescrip-
tive competence, however, do not fulfill the require-
ments of a rational and maximally effective process of
authoritative decision because their very covertness
prevents an ongoing appraisal of the conditions under
which an intermittent prescriptive authority, deviating
from established institutional patterns, should be recog-
nized and the criteria by which its operation should be
evaluated.
6. Institutional Responsiveness to Crisis
It is commonplace that institutionalized decision
must be able to deal with extraordinary as well as with
ordinary problems. Unfortunately, institutionalized
processes frequently develop a rigidity, if not rigor
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mortis, paralleled on the psychological level by a re-
sistance to change on the part of entrenched elites.
Ego involvement in a certain set of procedures may lead
the individual to view any suggested change as a repudi-
ation of the self and to regard every retention of
established practice as a vindication of the self. Such
inflexibility on both the personal and aggregate insti-
tutional levels handicaps optimal response to those
situations of major crisis, in which the imminent loss
of crucial values is perceived. The net result of this
handicap may be to increase or accelerate the crisis
while paralyzing institutional decision processes from
rational and effective response. Constitutive processes
of prescription should, by appropriate personnel and
structural adjustment, be made sensitive to potential
crises, anticipating them where possible and responding
at the earliest appearance. This sensitivity should
characterize both the most comprehensive global consti-
tutive process and the comparable internal processes of
its lesser constituent communities.
D. Bases of Power
A prescription is distinguished from other prefer-
ential statements in that it is viewed as authoritative
by those to whom it is addressed and in that its audi-
ence concludes that the prescriber, or a surrogate of-
ficial, intends to and, indeed, can make it controlling.
The expectations of the target audience are of course in-
ferred from the total context, including various features
of the function of application. The putative prescriber
must, therefore, seek authority and control upon which to
base his acts. From the standpoint of public order, an
appropriate prescriptive process requires both explicit
and implicit authority and the optimal marshaling of
bases in such manner as to create the necessary expecta-
tions of control in the promulgative sequences of pre-
scription and its application. We consider each of these
requirements seriatim.
1. Explicit Bases of Authority
The 19th century historicalist school of juris-
prudence drew particular attention to the ongoing, indi-
genous process of prescription which attends any flow of
interaction and which generates expectations of authority
in the minds of participants without reference to offi-
cial, organized arenas of prescription. From a policy
oriented perspective, however, the fact that interacting
participants ineluctably prescribe in no way discharges
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observers and decision-makers from the necessity of
rationalizing and optimalizing processes of prescription
which fulfill the basic requirements of adequate world
public order: effectiveness, rationality, and inclu-
sivity. Consequently, in sharp distinction to the
historicalist, we have emphatically recommended the
establishment and maintenance of a wide and varied
range of organized prescriptive processes, capable of
considering prospectively and by systematic application
of the intellectual tasks of decision, the prescriptive
requirements of a world public order of human dignity.
Such processes patently require explicit bases of au-
thority coextensive with the scope of their prescriptive
aspirations. Explicit bases of authority, it may be
added, are not identical with textual affirmations of
authority. Although a text may be a tentative indicator
of a base of authority, it is not sufficient unless it
corresponds to shared expectations of elites relevant to
the prescriptive aspirations of the process in question.
2. Implicit Bases of Authority
The demand for adequate explicit bases of prescrip-
tive authority is balanced by a coordinate demand for
full recognition of the fact of, and continuing potential
for, the generation of implicit expectations of authority
in the myriad patterns of social interaction. Policies
of economy and representativeness are served not by a
totalitarian incorporation of all sectors of life into
the public order, but rather by reserving areas of social
life for the prescriptive and applicative regulation of
the participants directly concerned. Hence, the notion
of implicit and regenerating authority in all social in-
teraction must be recognized. Because authority, in its
empirically referential sense, is simply expectations
shared by individuals as to how decisions will be made,
any attempt to inventory authority in the global or less
inclusive arenas of the world will perforce be obliged
to examine both explicit and implicit authority expecta-
tions.
3. Effective Control
We distinguish authoritative decision from pretended
decision because the communications of the former in re-
gard to policies for value allocation include sufficient-
ly credible indications of an intention to render author-
itative policy into controlling fact to create expecta-
tions of effectiveness in a target audience. There is,
as we have emphasized, scant utility in speaking of law
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in any- community unless expectations of authority and
control are copresent. If prescriptive processes in
the world community are to be effective, rational, and
inclusive, they must be buttressed by processes of ef-
fective control. Since control is never an arithmetical
computation discrete from context, it is obvious that
the components of effectiveness will vary from context to
context and will be decisively shaped not merely by the
allocation of base values, but also by the content of the
prescription and in particular the groups it alternately
indulges and deprives. Therefore, our recommendation is
that inclusive prescriptive processes be girded with a
control base in the relevant values adequate to secure
common interests.
E. Strategies
The optimum policies for the strategic procedures
involved in the characteristic sequences of prescription
can be most economically considered in terms of explora-
tion, characterization, and communication, the more
important sequences which must be adequately performed
for effective prescription.67 We consider each briefly.
1. Exploration
The process of prescription is initially concerned
with an examination of the facts, including the features
of present and projected contexts relevant to future
policy. It is also concerned with an inventory of the
alternative policy choices which are available for pre-
scription. Policies for this phase of exploration, as
for any intelligence function, involve comprehensiveness,
selectivity, dependability, and creativity. The achieve-
ment of these policies depends both upon the economy of
institutional processes or unorganized routines and upon
the base values made available.
2. Characterization
The median prescribing sequence entails a process
of characterization of the products of systematic explo-
ration in decision about what facts are to be regarded
as relevant and what policies are to be projected into
the future; this characterization moves, in its apprais-
al of the probable value consequences of different poli-
cies, steadily from provisionality to comparative final-
ity. The policies relevant to rational characterization
67. See pp. 252-54 supra for a sequential analysis of prescrip-
tion.
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are those of deliberation and reasoned assessment in
terms of common interest.
3. Communication
The final strategic sequence of prescription, often
overlooked in jurisprudential models, involves communi-
cation to the target community of the policy content of
the prescription, activation of authority signals, and
the modulation of credible control intentions. The se-
quence of communication involves more than the legal
concept of promulgation. Promulgation refers to a
ritualized act without which an authoritative applier is
not supposed to give effect to a putative prescription.
Communication, by contrast, involves a set of techniques,
varying with context, aimed at creating shared common
subjectivities in the target audience. On the constitu-
tive level, communication involves an ongoing mobiliza-
tion of community attention for continuing interest in
the prescriptive response to significant problems. In-
sofar as this general mobilization is successful, indi-
viduals will be constantly involved in participating in
and monitoring prescriptive processes, demanding contex-
tually and temporally appropriate prescription, accept-
ing common and rejecting special interests, and testing
inherited prescription for its contemporary contribution
to community goals,.
Conclusion
The examination of past trends in the global pre-
scribing process for ascertaining the degree of approxi-
mation to recommended policies must, of course, require
a systematic survey of the functioning of the different
features of that process in relation to the outcomes in
prescription achieved concerning all the important prob-
lems of constitutive process and public order. Effective
inquiry about the factors conditioning past practice and
possible projections into the future, with estimate of
potential losses and benefits to policy, will depend upon
the delicate, contextual assessment of a whole array of
predispositional and environmental variables. The recom-
mendation of more detailed, rational improvements in the
global prescribing function, in the light of knowledge
acquired through appropriate trend and scientific study,
will require exploration of every facet, for identifica-
tion of possible changes, both of the most comprehensive
constitutive process of authoritative decision and the
effective power processes which establish and maintain
authoritative decision.
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